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Book Review

A Review of Frederiksen's *Handbook for Organizational Behavior Management*

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One way of assessing the value of the information in the *Handbook for Organizational Behavior Management* puts it at somewhere around five billion dollars. The estimate is based upon the potential economic saving that could result from application of the material in two of the chapters, Kempen's chapter on Absenteeism and Tardiness and Sulzer-Azaroff's chapter on Behavioral Approaches to Occupational Health and Safety. Kempen informs us that recent estimates put the cost of absenteeism in the United States at above twenty-six billion dollars per year. That is what it costs to pay for people who do not come to work! Sulzer-Azaroff informs us that about twenty-three billion dollars goes for lost wages, medical, insurance, and other costs of accidents that occur at work. The combined total bill for these wastes of human resources is over forty-nine billion dollars annually in the United States. (We do not have the data for the rest of the world.)

If we estimate that widespread application of the techniques described in the two chapters would lead to just a bit over a ten percent reduction in these wastes, we arrive at the five billion dollar figure mentioned above. Of course, the five billion dollar estimate is not very satisfactory. On the one hand, the organizational behavior management techniques are not free. They cost something to implement—not necessarily more than the less effective techniques they would replace, but they do cost something. The net saving might be less than five billion. On the other hand, the estimate of a ten percent reduction is conservative, given the data presented in the book. The net saving might be more than five billion. Chances are, the value of the knowledge in the book handily exceeds the purchase price—especially if we also figure in the potential value of the material in the chapters on improving sales performance, improving productivity, managing energy resources, or enhancing employee motivation.

Another way of assessing the potential value of the handbook is to see how it fits into the overall context of organizations. What could the knowledge contained in the book contribute to organizational functioning? Where and how would it make a contribution? To do the assessment, consider some of what we know about organizational functioning. Organizations are entities that bring together men, money, and materials to produce valuable goods and services, or so the old textbooks tell us. Newer textbooks have given up the chauvinistic alliteration and speak of human resources, money, and materials. Not just men but humans. Not just any human but humans who are resources: People with the know-how to use the money and materials effectively.

Chief Executive Officers say, often and sincerely, "Our people are our most important resources!" Unfortunately, beyond tossing off that lovely sentiment in speeches and using bonuses and special perquisites for key executives, the typical CEO's human resource management repertoire is limited. While personally having real ability to get things done through people, the typical CEO has risen to the position through special abilities in managing financial resources or through special abilities relevant to the basic products or services of the particular organization. Neither the CEO nor the

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CEO's staff is likely to have special expertise in human resource management.

One of the reasons for the relative lack of expertise in human resource management is that it has not been at all clear that there is any such thing as expertise in human resource management. Rather than believe in such expertise, it is more common to follow the lead of the industrial engineers at Hawthorne and throw up one's hands at the complexity, diversity, and just plain cussedness of humans. Rather than designing organizations based on a clear perspective on how to manage the human element, it is more common to try to design organizations that cannot be messed up by the human element. The human side of the enterprise is viewed as a mixed blessing at best.

The situation is far different for the financial and materials sides of the enterprise. There are several financial professions to help manage the financial areas by exploring alternative investments, keeping track of costs, and establishing pricing structures. It is these professions that are usually the fast track to the top and the ones that tell us all about the bottom line and other important aspects of business economics.

There are also several business professions to help manage the legal, marketing, data processing, clerical, and personnel functions; and there are professions that have the technical expertise necessary to conduct the basic business. There are experts in materials handling, purchasing, production scheduling, inventory control. There are experts in special service business areas, such as banking, insurance, medicine, communications. The business professions are well supported by educational institutions. Colleges, universities, and technical schools offer dozens of degree programs and hundreds of continuing education courses in the technical and financial areas.

The offerings are much different in the human resource area. There are, to be sure, degree programs in personnel administration and, lately, in training and development; however, the "real" business person looks down on them as degrees in paper shuffling and hand holding, administering fringe benefits, counseling misfits, collecting withholding taxes, and sending out W-2 forms. There are also the human relations courses for managers in which people learn about Theory X, Y, and Z, get a touch of Maslow, a dash of Herzberg, and a break in their routine that starts up again on Monday morning largely untouched by the new learning. (It's nice, they say, but it doesn't tell you how to get the product out the door.)

Whether we look at school curricula, continuing education courses, or business practices, the picture is the same. If we imagine that the structure of enterprise is supported upon three legs (the financial leg, the material resource leg, and the human resource leg), then it is clear that two of the legs are strong and the third, if not actually made of silly putty, is at least a little shaky. The structure of enterprise is precariously balanced upon financial and material resource considerations.

If the economy were to collapse, what we would be left with would be the human and material resources, though we would have lost a reasonably adequate means of keeping score of the exchanges of goods and services that ultimately serve the most important human resource, the customer. As we deplete our material resources, we are left with a greater need to attend to our human resources, those people with the expertise necessary to do more with less, those people with the expertise to invent better and less wasteful technologies, those people with the expertise to train the employees and to educate the consumers to function in the complex and hazardous world of today and tomorrow. The Chief Executive Officers are right. People are the most important resource.

The balance of our entire social structure is maintained only by human resources, the persons with the know-how to use the resources of enterprise well. This is true and reasonably well known. What is not so well known is that there is substantive knowledge about human resource management that could be used to shore up this aspect of enterprise. The *Handbook of Organizational Behavior Management* has much to offer to those who are interested in managing human resources well. Work in the area of organizational behavior management, along with work in allied areas, has brought us to the threshold of a viable and comprehensive approach to human resource management that is commensurate with the importance of the area. We are on the threshold of having a truly effective human resource management profession.

The profession is developing as the behavioral engineering arm of behavioral science and is now in the process of being formed and tempered through practical, replicable, and widespread applications to human resource management problems in the real world of public and private sector organizations. Much of that work is captured and ably presented in the *Handbook of Organizational Behavior Management* edited by Lee Frederiksen (as well as in its companion and competitor, *Industrial Behavior Modification* edited by Richard O'Brien, Alyce Dickinson, and Michael Rosow [1982]).

Frederiksen has not only done an excellent job of selecting topics and authors, but he has also done the hard work necessary to get them to write their chapters in a useful and readable format. The strong editorial leadership is evident throughout the book. Frederiksen left the authors free to present the content as they see it but managed to achieve a commendable consistency of format, structure, and clarity in the writing.

A strength and weakness of the book is that it accurately reflects the diversity of perspectives in the field. The authors are primarily from academia and consulting firms but public sector organizations, business, and industry are also represented. Most of the work described occurred in real organizational contexts (as contrasted to laboratory settings). It is written for organizational practitioners rather than for researchers, although researchers will be pleased to discover that chapter bibliographies collectively cite the bulk of the relevant research literature.

Part 1 deals with definitional questions: What is Organizational Behavior Management (OBM)? How does it differ from other approaches? Where does it come from? What is its essence and substance?

Part 2 deals with methodological questions: How can we assess the performance of individuals? How can we identify the performances with which we ought to be concerned? How can we tell if our techniques are effective?

Part 3 deals with questions of technique: How can we use behavioral change techniques effectively in an organization? How can we overcome resistance to change? How can we set up performance feedback systems effectively? How can we relate behavior change efforts to strategic plans for business? How can individuals use behavioral techniques to improve their own performance?

Part 4 deals with questions of results: How can we apply behavioral techniques to make a real impact in areas such as absenteeism, safety, sales, employee motivation, management development, resource management?

Some of the chapters in Part 4 come very close to being the technical how-to-do-it chapters one would hope to find in a handbook of a mature field. Kempen's chapter on absenteeism and tardiness is a good example. Readers who would like a practical guide for developing effective organizational programs can find what they need in this chapter, and it is written so that the intelligent lay person can use it effectively. The same is true of Sulzer-Azaroff's chapter on safety; however, readers would have to have some behavioral skill and confidence that Sulzer-Azaroff's technical accounts of behavioral processes are worth careful study. They are, but that might not be obvious to someone hoping for an easy read.

Several issues are inherent in the material covered by the book. One issue relates to what organizational behavior management really is. Is it an area of research? (One of the authors, Komaki, treats it as such.) Is it a technological recipe for technological change? (Some of the authors, e.g. Luthans, Mirman, & Ross, treat it as such.) Is it just another human relations approach to be added to a manager's repertoire? (None of the authors treats it as such!) Is it a totally new perspective? (Frederiksen argues that it is.)

A second issue relates to where organizational behavior management fits into an organization. Is it a way of managing human resources? (Several of the authors would argue that it is.) Is it a promising approach to solving a few vexing problems? (The book demonstrates that it is at least that.) Is it a refinement of existing ways of managing? (It is at least that, and Scott and Podsakoff, among others, indicate that it is somewhat more.)

A third issue concerns what and how we manage when we take an organizational behavior management approach. Do we manage processes or outcomes? Do we manage by devising organizational control systems to control behavior or do we manage organizational control systems to control the results of behavior? Do we manage behaviors or do we manage accomplishments?

The three issues are intertwined. Frederiksen discusses the first two in his introductions to the four parts of the book and in his very fine overview chapter. He argues that OBM is not simply a supplement or a collection of techniques: It is a very different approach, a totally new perspective on understanding, measuring, and managing behavior in organizational settings. The approach is well described on page 179:

> First, all the authors share a common view of behavior. We must look closely at what people do and not simply what they say about what they do. Second, the authors recognize that the key to managing behavior is attention to its context. We must carefully attend to the events that precede behavior and the consequences that follow it. Third, the maintenance of behavior must also be carefully planned for and not left to chance. Finally, the success of our efforts must be carefully assessed and not just assumed. The net effect of this approach is to provide the manager with specific, workable suggestions rather than global unattainable admonitions.

The authors also share systematic approaches to problem solving, making it clear that OBM techniques are to be used in the context of real organizational problems, constraints, and goals rather than as supplementary techniques or a band-aid solution to a hastily analyzed problem.

But what is so new about all that? Certainly managers, especially those trained in systematic problem solving techniques, know that problems must be verified to establish organizational importance and analyzed to discover controlling variables, and that solutions must be tailored to organizational context. Managers know that solutions cannot be simply slapped on and expected to work forever. In fact, maintenance of performance is exactly what supervision is all about! A production line or a department is set up as a workable solution to a problem, such as producing goods efficiently. The supervisor's entire job is to assure that the "solution" works and is maintained.

So what is new about OBM? I think that there are three new contributions of the OBM perspective. The first is new to managers but not to behavioral psychologists: careful attention to the *immediate context,* to the antecedents and consequences of behavior, to the contingencies of reinforcement.

The second new contribution of the OBM perspective is not particularly new to managers but is rather new to behavioral psychologists: careful attention to the *broad context* of organizational variables that identifies which variables need to be modified and which need to be maintained and which contingencies of reinforcement are feasible to maintain.

The third new contribution of the OBM perspective is new to both managers and to behavioral psychologists: careful attention to relating the immediate context variables to the broad context variables. We have known for a long time that things work better when what is good for the organization is good for the individual (and vice versa), but we have had only the fuzziest notions about how to bring about that desired state. The OBM perspective can provide very specific guidance in matching individual and organizational interests. It does so by bringing together two different and essentially correct but incomplete perspectives on behavior in organizations.

An industrial engineer or systems-trained business manager might symbolize the managerial perspective as it is shown in Figure 1.

A worker is given inputs which are converted into outputs and sent on to other parts of the organization. The feedback organizational receiving system is not a salient part of the psychologist's perspective for several good reasons. First of all, the significance of those business statistics is somewhat beyond the ken of the non-business person. Perhaps the statistics relate to important economic



Figure 1 Partial Performance System: Managerial Perspective



Figure 2 Partial Performance System: Psychological Perspective

loop going back to the worker would contain information loosely connected to performance, e.g. weekly production figures, year-to-date costs, plant safety data, the name of the employee of the month.

A behavior analyst or systems trained psychologist might symbolize the psychological perspective as it is shown in Figure 2.

A worker is given inputs which are converted into outputs and sent on to other parts of the organization. The feedback loop represents performance related stimuli, both antecedent and consequent, that are immediately presented to the worker.

The external feedback loop from the variables, but they are not well understood by the typical behavior analyst. They are, after all, too delayed to be psychologically salient and are usually aggregated in such a way that their relevance to the individual performer is muddled if not totally obscured. They cannot possibly be the antecedents and consequents, they cannot possibly be the contingencies that govern an individual's behavior.

Similarly, the internal feedback loop from the worker back to the worker is not a salient part of the industrial engineering or business management perspective. First of all, the significance of those immediate antecedents and consequents is somewhat beyond the ken of the non-behavior analyst. Perhaps they are important psychologically, but they not well-understood by the typical manager. They are, after all, too personal and idiosyncratic and uncontrollable to be something that the overall enterprise can deal with reasonably. They cannot be the stuff with which the practical manager can deal effectively.

The two perspectives are certainly different and apparently incompatible. One perspective deals with business variables and the other deals with psychological variables, and each is essentially accurate within its domain. What is really new about OBM is that it brings these two perspectives together into one coherent point of view that remains true to both positions. The combined perspective can be symbolized as shown in Figure 3.

If human resources are an important part of the enterprise, then the psychological variables symbolized by the internal feedback loop *are* business variables. If the business environment is important to human behavior, then the business variables symbolized by the external feedback loop *are* psychological variables. The external loop from the receiving system relates to business measures, but they should be business measures that are not merely available to the performer; they should be business measures that are relevant to the individual's (or the work group's) performance, that show how the individual performance relates to organizational performance.

Most of the OBM work described in the book relates to making that external feedback loop more functional, more explicitly related to individual performance, more clearly related to incentives, and more clearly relating long term goals to short term performance. In other words, the broad context variables are related to individual performance in such a way that they modify the immediate reinforcement contingencies and produce changes in behavior.

For example, most of the applications and results reported in Part 4 revolve around establishing business measures that would function effectively as performance feedback. In addition, Fairbanks and Prue have written an excellent chapter on "Developing Performance Feedback Systems" that provides clear guidance about how to do just that.

It is likely that all of the authors of the work reported in the book carefully considered measures relevant to the internal feedback loop (e.g., Andrasik and Heimberg on Self-Management Procedures) and carefully considered potential immediate reinforcement contingen-



Figure 3 Total Performance System: OBM Perspective

cies (e.g., Sulzer-Azaroff's chapter on Behavioral Approaches to Occupational Health and Safety). Nevertheless, these considerations were often not as explicitly described as behavior analysts might prefer. On the other hand, talk of reinforcement theory and contingencies might well appear to be unnecessary digressions into jargon to some readers. (There was considerable redundant explanation of behavioral concepts across chapters which adds to the impression of too much jargon. There were even a few instances of technical vocabulary being used sloppily solely as jargon.)

Some of the chapters dealt very clearly with relationships between measures of business performance and measures of individual performance. The Zemke and Gunkler chapter on an "Organization-wide Intervention" is a beautiful example. The authors were quite explicit that their task was to work out "the business proposition." The business proposition is management's theory of the business, expressed in terms of the employee behavior they believe will produce results that have organizational value. A case study showed how the business proposition was operationalized, how social reinforcement systems were established to obtain employee behavior, how the social reinforcement systems were related to longer term incentive systems, and how the incentive systems were tied explicitly to key measures of business performance. The details of the procedures are specific to the organization described but the procedures could readily be used as models for dealing with essentially the same organizational variables in other settings.

An added value of the case study came from an unexpected opportunity to do a reversal study. We sometimes talk, naively, as if bottom line results are the assurance of continuation of a program, but this is not necessarily so. A new management team took over and cut costs. One cost they cut was that of maintaining the incentive system and the associated measurement systems. The new managers reckoned that the cost was excessive for an employee motivation program, and they were right. The cost was out of line for typical employee motivation programs that usually do not work very well because they are not adequately related to measures of important business results and to individual performance. The new management knew that cutting a normally effective and abnormally costly employee motivation program was a good thing to do. (They can be forgiven for not believing the consultants' obviously biased allegations that their strange and elaborate system was contributing significantly to business results.) They cut out the system but allowed the consultants to continue collecting data, affording the opportunity to do a reversal study.

The data showed a marked deterioration in performance. The deterioration was so marked that it presented management with an interesting problem: Should they admit they had cut the wrong cost and reinstate the system? The best business decision would be to admit the mistake and reinstate the system. On the other hand, the best career decision might be to follow a time-tested tactic and bury the mistake. Neither behavior analysts nor experienced managers will be surprised at what the decision was.

Hall's chapter on "Strategic Planning for Employee Productivity Improvement" also emphasizes the importance of the broad context, of working out the business proposition, of considering the total performance system before "fixing" something. Drawing upon his considerable experience and knowledge of successes and failures in consulting, he offers a very sensible and comprehensive program for looking at performance in an organizational context. Readers interested in a behaviorally sound approach to organizational development will find much to value in the chapter.

Gilbert's chapter on "Analyzing Productive Performance" is an enlightening excursion into some of the specific problems encountered in attempts to relate individual performance to organizational performance. Written in Gilbert's engaging and pungent style, the chapter cautions us that some of the things accountants do that mystify normal managers and behavior analysts alike are *designed* to obscure rather than elucidate.

Standard tax accounting practices are valuable, in part, through assuring that all costs are shown or estimated liberally and properly so that the organization doesn't accidentally show a large profit and pay unnecessary taxes. On the other hand, other standard accounting practices are also valuable, in part, through assuring that profitability looks good and that management mistakes are hidden from stockholders and investors. The whole thing is all very proper, and independent auditors are employed to assert that all is done according to standard accounting practices. When it comes to knowing what specific activities actually cost and what value they have to the organization, standard accounting practices are less valuable. They are established by the accounting profession, after all, not by managers. Standard accounting practices just are not suited to dealing with special business problems. [Profits are *not* the sort of bottom line we often take them to be. While operating losses are not long tolerable in either a profit or a non-profit organization, high profits are not a worthy goal in any organization. They are simply one of the measures that are kept to show in a general way how the business is faring.]

Gilbert also emphasizes the importance of creating performance-based job models and describing accomplishments, measures, and standards so that individual performance contributes optimally to organizational performance. Measures and standards relevant to valuable accomplishments are used to provide data that are useful and meaningful to performer and manager alike.

When referring to individual performance, Gilbert is referring to two parts of the business proposition, the behavior and the results of behavior. The behavioral part of performance is always a cost item in Gilbert's analyses. Accomplishments, the results of the behavior, are the valuable part of performance. The worthy accomplishments must offset the costly behavior if performance is to be valuable.

To anlayze productive performance, then, one establishes the value of the accomplishments relative to the costs of producing them. While that sounds like something every school child knows, it is done only in the aggregate and not very precisely in most businesses. True, it has to balance out when brought down to the bottom line, but much can happen on the way to obscure the nature of the relationships between individual and group behaviors and accomplishments.

If we analyze performance by analyzing only the behavior, we analyze performance incorrectly. Behavior analysts trained in the notion that the thing to do is analyze behavior per se and leave the economic matters up to someone else might find this to be a difficult point to fully comprehend and joyfully embrace. For present purposes, it is enough to point out that Gilbert is not saying that we should never look at behavior or that we should never establish contingencies to change behavior. He is saying, however, that the social or economic value of performance comes from the effects behavior has upon the environment and that we had better understand those environmental effects if we are to understand behavior in organizations.

Gilbert's strategy is to consider the value of the accomplishments before analyzing topography of behavior. That is a very reasonable way to analyze productive performance. Gilbert also advocates setting contingencies based upon the outcomes (e.g., the accomplishments, the opening of the microswitch in the laboratory apparatus) rather than details of topography (e.g., whether the salesperson maintains eye contact, whether the microswitch is pressed with the right hand or the left).

Once the analysis has shown that a particular aspect of topography is important, further analysis might show that it is necessary to establish special contingencies to maintain the particular topography. Identifying measures and standards and establishing reinforcement contingencies relevant to the closely related accomplishments will usually but not always be enough. Behaviors related to safety afford many examples.

Operating a stamping press with both hands on the control switches is less efficient than tieing one switch down and using the free hand to position the metal being stamped. It increases the ease of the work and increases the probability that the hand will eventually be stamped along with the metal. To achieve the accomplishment of accident-free work, the behavioral engineer might very well establish special contingencies relevant to the alternative topographies, since the "natural" contingencies will not sustain the proper topography adequately.

The issue of whether one should manage performance by establishing contingencies relevant to behavior or to the outcomes of behavior has minimal theoretical importance; however, it has enormous practical importance because it relates to the general issue of managing processes vs. managing products or outcomes. For example, it makes an enormous difference whether one treats annual profits as a process measure or as an outcome measure. Zero or less profit shows a bad result viewed simply as an outcome measure; however, the profitless year can be excellent if viewed as a process measure that is part of a strategic plan for repositioning in the marketplace.

Winett and Geller discuss some of the considerations relevant to process vs. outcome measures in their chapter on "Resource Management in Organizational Settings." Resource management is an area where the process vs. outcome distinction is quite important. A thermostat setting is a process measure that relates to energy consumption as an outcome measure. (Energy consumption, from another point of view, is also a process measure related to the costs of doing business and profit as an outcome measure.) Measurement of the frequency of positive supervisory comments is a process measure, perhaps related to the setting of thermostats as outcome measures. The point of these examples is simply that one can readily get confused about whether the measure itself represents a desired outcome. People are very good at getting hooked on immediate process measures and ignoring the longer term outcome measures. That is really quite understandable, since whether or not something is a process measure or an outcome measure depends, not on the facts of the matter, but upon the perspective one takes in doing the analysis or in managing the system.

Which are better, process measures or outcome measures? There is controversy about this. The OBM controversy about the merits of measures of behavior or measures of accomplishment is one example. Which measures are better? The answer, at least from the OBM perspective schematically represented in Figure 3, is very clear. Both are better! Each is sometimes important for one purpose or another, and both are necessary for effective organizational behavior management. The internal feedback loop of the Total Performance System primarily represents process measures, and the external feedback loop represents outcome measures. Both are needed.

The process measures are needed for short term guidance. In safety, for example, it is well known that lost time accidents decline temporarily after a serious accident and then increase again until the next serious accident. Managing safety performance using outcome measures alone results in a system that reaches an equilibrium point that includes an unnecessarily high level of accidents. (We know that the level is unnecessarily high because adding process measures relevant to safe and unsafe acts can reduce accidents further.)

Outcome measures are needed for longer term guidance and for validation of the shorter term process measures. For example, the way we determine whether it is better to reinforce safe acts than to punish unsafe acts is to determine which process results in a better long term outcome. And the way we determine whether incentives for good attendance plus disciplinary measures for poor attendance is better than either alone is to determine which process or set of processes results in better long term outcomes.

Incidentally, the logic and a research methodology for making such determinations is well described and illustrated in

Komaki's chapter, "The Case for the Single Case: Making Judicious Decisions about Alternatives." While written from a researcher's perspective, the chapter describes methods that could be used effectively by persons who thoroughly understand the workings of real organizations. Similarly, persons thoroughly familiar with evaluation methodology could find the analytical approach described in the chapter to be a much more useful tool for evaluation than the more widely known and nearly always inappropriate and unuseable control group designs.

One chapter of the book is valuable because it represents excellence in use of process measures, showing the best that can be done with process measures alone. Latham's chapter on "Behavior-Based Assessment for Organizations" deals with traditional performance appraisal practices. Performance appraisals, as ordinarily used, are process measures even though they occur very infrequently, usually annually. Practically everyone knows that is not often enough for process measures. Performance appraisal measures are process rather than outcome measures largely by default—they have little apparent or demonstrated relationship to organizational outcomes. Further, they are ordinarily loosely related to process as well. The appraisal is often based upon general supervisory perceptions of the performer rather than on specific observations of behavior. Thus the typical performance appraisal session deals with inaccurate perceptions of irrelevant dimensions of performance.

Latham's work is a refinement of the traditional approaches. He shows how to sharpen and improve upon existing practices to get the appraisals to relate more precisely to the actual behavior of the person being appraised. He shows us how to correct some of the common problems with the measures by using behavior observation scales that assure that supervisory perceptions are reasonably accurate and related to dimensions that people believe to be important.

To be validly used in making promotions or to be used in validating selection procedures, however, the appraisals should, by law and purpose, be related specifically to outcome measures. Ordinarily, they are not related to outcome measures because the profession of industrial/organizational psychology has yet to devise adequate procedures for measuring outcomes of complex jobs such as those of managers, consultants, and professors. (The chapter by Scott and Podsakoff on "Leadership, Supervision, and Behavioral Control: Perspectives from the Experimental Analysis" will be useful to those readers who want to know more about why that is so.)

Until performance appraisals are adequately related to outcome measures, the performance appraisal process continues to run the risk of minimal utility and marginal legality. If Latham's improved procedures are used, performance appraisals will still run the risk of being somewhat more than normally accurate perceptions of unvalidated dimensions of performance. Once outcome measures are established, then Latham's improved process measures might become useful, although that is by no means assured. Nevertheless, I was very glad to see Latham's chapter included in the handbook. It represents excellent work with essentially traditional approaches. Sometimes things have to be done very well before it becomes clear that they just do not work. Positioned just before Gilbert's chapter which shows practical ways of relating relevant process measures to worthwhile outcome measures, Latham's chapter goes a long way toward demonstrating the inherent futility of traditional approaches.

It will be interesting to see how Latham comes to grips with such problems in the future. I hope he will not follow the lead of the major professional associations that deal with performance appraisal and simply defend the traditional approaches by inventing new kinds of validity to shore up the inherently inadequate methodology. We need persons of his ability to help the OBM field move ahead in using relevant process measures and defensible outcome measures. The performance appraisal area is much too important to be ignored to the extent that most of us in the OBM area have ignored it.

Latham's chapter, along with Warren's chapter "Performance Management and Management Performance," deals with issues that are critical if OBM is going to fulfill its potential in the human resource management area. Warren does an excellent job both of laying out an effective approach to management development and of providing solid criticism of traditional, non-behavioral approaches. He effectively lays to rest many assumptions about management development, offering constructive alternatives and specific suggestions in their place.

Warren opens his chapter with an observation that is worth repeating here:

> The spreading application of technologies rooted in behaviorism does not stem from agreement with behavioral theories. Rather, it grows from recognition that to be productive, an organization requires workable management processes that lead to predictable results (p. 539).

Behavioral applications are valued by managers because they are replicable and useable ways of attaining goals. The results are more important than the theories.

Finally, one prerogative of a book reviewer is to say derogatory things about the book, a task to which I now turn without much enthusiasm. Even the flaws attest to the potential value. To give a trivial example, the too frequent typographical errors might have been reduced had those in charge of its production had it to read in advance. (None of the typo's encountered were particularly damaging. The spelling of Karen Brethower's name is not improved by an extra H, George Odiorne's is not improved by an extra R, and Nalder is not a better way to spell Nadler. The other errors were no more damaging.)

A more important flaw of the book stems from the fact that the authors did not have the benefit of the other chapters as they wrote. For example, the mildly annoying differences in the way various authors chose to break up the steps in the problem solving process could have been avoided, as could some but not all the redundancies in the descriptions of behavioral terms. As already suggested above, Latham's chapter might have helped move us two steps forward rather than only one if he had been able to make use of the material in Gilbert's chapter and in Warren's chapter.

Similarly, the chapter by Krapfl and Gasparotto on "Behavioral Systems Analysis" might have been better if they had been able to make use of some of the information in the chapters by Gilbert, Zemke and Gunkler, and Fairbank and Prue.

I was disappointed in the Krapfl and Gasparotto chapter, not because of glaring flaws, but because I had hoped for so much. They took on the challenging task of describing how basic principles of behavior analysis/operant conditioning can be combined with basic concepts of systems analysis to form the hybrid, behavioral systems analysis. The fundamental communication problem facing anyone who ventures to write on this topic is that behavior analysis principles seem at first blush to be hopelessly narrow, simplistic, and naive to persons with systems theory backgrounds. Similarly, systems concepts seem at first blush to be hopelessly broad, vague, and naive to persons with behavior analysis backgrounds.

Leading people to sophistication in either area in eighteen pages is just not possible. I fear that the chapter will leave behavior analysts unconvinced that useful precision can be achieved by systems concepts and that it will leave systems analysts unconvinced that useful generality can be achieved by operant conditioning concepts. That is particularly disappointing to me because I believe that bringing together experts in the immediate context (behavior analysts) with experts in the broad context (systems analysts) is necessary if OBM is to fulfill its great promise and continue its impressive successes.

The book is not perfect, not the last word on human resource management. Much more remains to be done. As an example, I would like to see a conference organized to which the authors of Frederiksen's book and the authors of the O'Brien, Dickinson, and Rosow book

(1982) are invited. Each author's "ticket of admission" to the conference would be a working outline and some extensive notes for the revisions of her or his chapter. The purpose of the conference would be to resolve some of the trivial procedural and terminological differences, to clarify the significant issues, and to thoroughly discuss them before coming out with the second editions of the books. Perhaps it would even be possible to create the structure for a combined and definitive new handbook that would stand up as the behavioral alternative to Dunette's highly regarded *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology.*

The OBM area is coming of age. Frederiksen has edited a book that I think will be regarded as a highly significant benchmark in the development of the field. That is a worthy achievement in a field that deals with important matters. The handbook furthers our understanding of important processes. In the right hands, it can help us all to move ahead toward our hopes for the future. In the right hands, it can be worth about five billion dollars a year. It is not perfect, but it is not a bad contribution to the literature.

Organizations have shown an ability to grow erratically and to consume and waste vast quantities of energy and material resources while failing to manage human resources well. When resources are plentiful, demand is high, technology is simple and stable, and competition is weak, organizations can function profitably even when badly managed. They can function profitably even though the people in them waste resources, make a lot of scrap, waste energy, undercut one another, produce low quality goods and services, and do so inefficiently. But such processes are self-limiting. The exchange of low quality goods and inadequate services is no basis for a sound economy. Limitless waste of limited human and material resources is not possible.

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